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The paper analyzes the role of monetary policy in an open economy 
model where the nominal  exchange  rate  responds  to news about future 
fundamentals. Extending their previous work (Devereux and Engel 
2006),  the authors  present a two-country  model in the class of the New 
Open Economy  Macro  literature,  where prices are sticky and a stochas- 
tic component of future productivity  becomes known a period in ad- 
vance.  The  model also includes  an internationally  traded  commodity  in- 
put, but this feature  is not essential  to the analysis  of the optimal  policy. 
The authors  show that price rigidity,  combined with the news shock 
to a future fundamental  and the presence of home bias in preferences, 
generates  an inefficient  allocation:  while in the flexible  price  case current 
consumption  depends only on current  fundamentals,  in the sticky  price 
case it depends on the news about future  productivity.  They then show 
how to devise a monetary  policy in the form  of an instrument  rule  -  they 
consider  in turn  a money supply rule and an interest  rate  rule  -  to repli- 
cate the flexible  price  equilibrium.  Monetary  policy should be designed 
to offset the effect  of the news on the nominal  exchange  rate. 
With  their  stylized model, Devereux and Engel intend to offer an ex- 
ample of the tension between the role of the exchange rate as an asset 
price  and its role as determinant  of relative  goods prices.  Their  paper is 
very interesting  and provocative,  and provides them  with a new ground 
to argue for the desirability of a monetary policy that promotes ex- 
change  rate  stability. 
I do not have the expertise  in international  macro  to discuss the ana- 
lytics of the paper. Nonetheless, I am uncomfortable  with the paper's 
conclusion about the desirability of offsetting exchange rate fluctua- 
tions. I will therefore limit my comments to raising a few questions 
about the nature  of their monetary  policy prescription,  and discussing 
the implications  that  the authors  draw from their  analytical  results. 170  Sbordone 
Observation 1 
The proposed policy is able to reproduce  the flexible  price  equilibrium: 
to what extent is it the policy that  maximizes  consumers'  welfare?  Also, 
how do we know that the proposed policy does not create  undesirable 
side  effects? The policy prevents the transmission of  information 
through  prices,  which is what a well-functioning  market  should do. Per- 
haps the authors  should give a better  intuition  for the nature  of the inef- 
ficiency that such diffusion of information  causes and clarify to what 
extent their result is driven by the very simple form of price rigidity  - 
with all prices set a period in advance  -  which is assumed in the paper. 
Observation  2 
The derived optimal  policy dampens  those fluctuations  in the exchange 
rate that derive from its response to the news. To  what extent should it 
be characterized  as an exchange  rate  policy,  which would involve mon- 
itoring  the exchange  rate? 
Devereux  and Engel  state  at some point that  "Common  wisdom (sup- 
ported  by the empirical  work of Devereux  and Engel  2006)  is that short 
run exchange  rate  movements are largely driven  by news about the fu- 
ture . . . therefore  the policies that target  news about the future are far 
more important  in delivering desirable  terms of trade movements and 
real exchange  rate  movements than the policies that target  current  fun- 
damentals"  (p. 18). 
This statement suggests that, if one wants to stabilize the exchange 
rate,  one should target  the news, because most of exchange  rate  shocks 
come from news. However, news are very hard to pin down, and the 
policy suggestion of the paper seems to be that  stabilizing  the exchange 
rate  would achieve an approximately  optimal  policy. 
But, should stabilization  of the exchange rate be the objective  of the 
policymakers?  The problem  with such a policy is that  it would offset as 
well those fluctuations  that reflect  instead the relative prices of goods, 
leading to inefficient  allocations.  Even  according  to the authors'  calcula- 
tions (see Devereux  and Engel  2006),  fundamentals  still represent  some 
20 percent  of exchange  rate  fluctuations. 
Observation 3 
The paper, however, raises the interesting issue of the importance  of 
news about future fundamentals. Recent research (Evans and Lyons Comment  171 
2007)  explores the empirical  relevance  of changes in fundamentals  ex- 
pectations  using data  on transaction  flows. The  idea is that  there  is more 
information  than what is publicly known, which is dispersed and as- 
similated by the market  through the trading process. The paper finds 
that transaction  flows predict  how the market  will react  to information 
about  future  macro  fundamentals,  and exchange  rates  respond  to trans- 
action  flows precisely  because they reflect  this change in market  expec- 
tations. 
But there is a sense in which the proposed reaction  of monetary  pol- 
icy to the news is problematic.  The news that matter  for exchange rate 
movements, in fact, might as well be news about future interest rate 
movements.  A change  in expectations  of the future  policy path is, for  ex- 
ample, often generated  by speeches of the Federal  Open Market  Com- 
mittee  (FOMC)  members,  or  by the FOMC  post-meeting  statement,  even 
in the absence  of any policy change,  or when a policy change  occurs  that 
is exactly  anticipated.  It  would indeed be very interesting  to explore  this 
hypothesis using information  on daily exchange  rate  movements,  look- 
ing at the times of policy announcements. 
The  case of whether  monetary  policy should aim at stabilizing  the ex- 
change  rate  is highly debated  in the literature.  Commonly  cited reasons 
why an exchange  rate should not be included in the policy rule rest es- 
sentially on the asset price nature of exchange rates: they are very 
volatile,  and their  movements  are  hard  to explain.  In  the model of this  pa- 
per the  particular  nominal  rigidity  assumed  makes  innovations  in the ex- 
change  rate  equal  to innovations  in the terms  of trade.  The  arguments  for 
excluding  the terms  of trade  from  explicit  consideration  in the policy rule 
are weaker than for the exchange  rate  because terms of trade are more 
predictable,  at least  since the 1980s  (see Rogoff  2006).  But  again,  the liter- 
ature  offers several plausible  cases where it is not necessary  to include 
them in a policy rule to achieve  the monetary  authority's  objectives. 
Concluding Comments 
To  conclude,  I want to go back  to the motivation  of the paper,  the obser- 
vation about the large swing in the relative price of oil in the United 
States versus the euro area  between 2002 and 2004. Carrying  over the 
conclusions  of the Devereux-Engel  model, should the European  Central 
Bank  (ECB)  and the Federal  Reserve  System have prevented the dollar 
depreciation?  Such a recommendation  not only runs counter to the 
theoretical  considerations  discussed previously, and the resistance of 
policymakers  to offset exchange  rate  movements,  but overlooks  the fact 172  Sbordone 
that  there  might have been good reasons  for  a dollar  depreciation  at that 
time, and that  preventing  it could have caused more inefficiencies. 
By the end of 2004, according  to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2006),  a large 
fall in the real value of the dollar was a necessary by-product of the 
needed reduction  of the U.S.  current  account  deficit.  While  there  may be 
no agreement on the size of the forecasted dollar depreciation,  most 
economists  would agree that the current  account  deficit  would require 
an increase  in the American  national  savings. Such  a rebalancing  would 
indeed imply a decline of the real value of the U.S. dollar,  and it is not 
clear  to what extent such a process could be obtained  without a decline 
in the nominal  value of the exchange  rate,  a realignment  that  we are  still 
experiencing.  (The  alternative  would be deflation,  surely  not a desirable 
way to bring about this adjustment.) 
Note 
The views expressed  in this discussion  do not necessarily  reflect  the position  of the Fed- 
eral  Reserve  Bank  of New York  or the Federal  Reserve  System. 
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